

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 OTTAWA 001413

SIPDIS

C-034-05

FOR CJCS, CSAF, CSA, CNO, AND CMC

TAGS: [PGOV](#)

SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR CANUS ARMED FORCES COUNCIL
(AFC)-JCS TALKS, 31 MAY-1 JUN 2005 (U)

[1](#). (C) CANADA-U.S. POL-MIL RELATIONS. PRIME MINISTER MARTIN LEADS A MINORITY GOVERNMENT THAT OPERATES WITH EXTREME CAUTION AND LACKS STABILITY. MARTIN,S OVERRIDING CONCERN IS POLITICAL SURVIVAL AS HE FACES A POTENTIAL NO-CONFIDENCE, VOTE 18 OR 19 MAY WHICH MANY BELIEVE WILL LEAD TO ELECTIONS BEING CALLED AT THE END OF JUNE 2005. THE PRESSURE ON THE LIBERALS COMES FROM THE RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF A CHRETIEN-ERA SCANDAL INVOLVING QUEBEC. SEALED EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY BY THE LIBERAL PARTY, LIKELY TO COME OUT IN THE JUNE TRIAL OF A KEY PLAYER IN THE SPONSORSHIP SCANDAL, HAS RATCHETED POLITICAL TENSIONS TO A FEVER PITCH AND FORCED THE LIBERAL AGENDA INTO NEAR-GRIDLOCK.

[1](#)A. (C) PM MARTIN HAS WAFFLED BETWEEN SENDING STRONG SIGNALS THAT HE WISHES TO IMPROVES CANUS RELATIONS AND CAMPAIGN RHETORIC THAT FOCUSED ON CANUS DIFFERENTIATION, TO BUILD ROOM BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE CONSERVATIVES WHO SUPPORT MUCH STRONGER TIES TO THE U.S. AND A MORE PROGRESSIVE DEFENSE AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. MARTIN ESTABLISHED AND CHAIRS A NEW CABINET COMMITTEE ON CANUS RELATIONS, CREATED A DHS-LIKE HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT (DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA) HEADED BY THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, AND HAS DEVOTED MORE RESOURCES FOR BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY AND TIGHTER IMMIGRATION SCREENING. STILL, AN AUDITOR GENERAL,S REPORT RELEASED 5 APRIL 05 CRITICIZES CANADIAN BORDER SECURITY EFFORTS AND COORDINATION.

[1](#)B. (U) IN APRIL, 2004 MARTIN PUBLISHED CANADA,S FIRST-EVER NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY WHICH FOCUSES ON:

- (1) (U) PROTECTING CANADA AND CANADIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD
- (2) (U) ENSURING CANADA IS NOT A BASE FOR THREATS TO ITS ALLIES
- (3) (U) CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

MARTIN ALSO PUSHED THROUGH THE AMENDMENT TO THE NORAD AGREEMENT, ALLOWING NORAD TO PERFORM THREAT WARNING (INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING/ATTACK ASSESSMENT) FOR THE MISSILE DEFENSE MISSION.

[1](#)2. (C) PRO-U.S. DEFENSE MINISTER WILLIAM ((GRAHAM)), PREVIOUSLY FOREIGN MINISTER, WAS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF CANADA JOINING MISSILE DEFENSE, BUT HAD TO BACK AWAY FROM HIS POSITION WHEN PM MARTIN MADE THE POLITICAL DECISION IN FEBRUARY 2005 NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN MISSILE DEFENSE. THOSE IN SECURITY AND DEFENSE CIRCLES WERE ALMOST UNIFORMLY IN FAVOR OF JOINING BMD AND THEY ARE STILL SMARTING AND DEFENSIVE OVER THE DECISION. MANY ARE LOOKING FOR DELIVERABLES TO APPEASE THE U.S. IN THE WAKE OF WHAT THEY SEE AS A DAMAGING STEP TO CANUS SECURITY COOPERATION AND RELATIONS OVERALL. PUSHED BY INDUSTRY AND LOCAL POLITICIANS LOOKING FOR A NEW MISSION FOR A BASE IN DECLINE, MINDEF GRAHAM IS IN FAVOR OF INSTALLING AN X-BAND RADAR AT CFB GOOSE BAY, LABRADOR TO CONTRIBUTE TO NORAD ITW/AA. (MDA SEES LIMITED UTILITY IN BASING AN X-BAND RADAR AT GOOSE BAY).

[1](#)3. (C) ON 1 APRIL, GEN HILLIER UNVEILED HIS VISION IN THE TANK FOR YOU, THE SERVICE CHIEFS, AND THE JOINT STAFF. SINCE BECOMING CDS IN FEB 05, HE REWROTE MOST OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW, REALIGNED SENIOR CANADIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND FORMED FULL-TIME ACTION GROUPS TO ENSURE HIS VISION IS ARTICULATED AND IMPLEMENTED. CHARGED WITH REGAINING RESPECT FOR THE CF, HE MUST SMARTLY INCREASE CF CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY WITH ONLY MINOR BUDGET INCREASES, ALL WHILE APPEASING THE CANADIAN PUBLIC,S PENCHANT FOR THE CF TO REMAIN A DOMESTIC FORCE WITH THE ABILITY TO SUPPORT MULTINATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND STABILITY OPERATIONS ABROAD. THE KEY THEMES OF GEN HILLIER,S VISION:

[1](#)A. (U) INCREASE CANADA,S INFLUENCE WITH DEPLOYMENTS IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS IN ONE FOOTPRINT AND MAKING CANADIAN FORCES MORE RESPONSIVE TO MODERN CONTINGENCIES WHERE ASYMMETRIC THREATS ARE THE NORM.

[1](#)B. (C/RELCAN) CREATE A COMMAND-CENTRIC, KNOWLEDGE-BASED AND TACTICALLY DECISIVE ARMY USING KEY ENABLERS LIKE C4ISR (CALLED ISTAR IN CANADA: INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE). THE PROGRESS IN C4ISR TRANSFORMATION IS NOW UNDER CRITICISM AS FRAGMENTED AND LACKING VISION IN A 5 APRIL 05 AUDITOR GENERAL REPORT.

[1](#)C. (C/RELCAN) FOCUS ON CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT A 3-BLOCK WAR, (CONCURRENT COMBAT, STABILIZATION, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE).

[1](#)D. (C/RELCAN) PACKAGE DISPARATE CF DEPLOYMENTS INTO ONE JOINT

FOOTPRINT AND COMMAND STRUCTURE. THIS IS TO BUILD CANADIAN INFLUENCE VIA LARGER IMPACT DEPLOYMENTS, RATHER THAN GETTING ONLY FLEETING CREDIT FOR PIECEMEAL EFFORTS DONE IN MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. CANADA,S AFGHANISTAN PRT IN AUG 05 WILL USE SUCH A STRUCTURE AND THE PLAN WAS TO BUILD TO A MAJOR BATTLE GROUP DEPLOYMENT OF 1,300, PROBABLY WITH 6 CF-18S IN EARLY CY2006. THIS PLAN IS ON HOLD FOR THE TIME BEING AS THE GOVERNMENT IS MARTIN GOVERNMENT IS FRANTICALLY TRYING TO GAIN POLITICAL TRACTION WITH IMMEDIATE FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH ARE POPULAR WITH THE PUBLIC AND WITH FENCE-SITTING POLITICIANS WHOSE VOTE COULD KEEP THE GOVERNMENT FROM BEING BROUGHT DOWN. CHIEF AMONG THESE IS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DARFUR REGION OF SUDAN. CDS GENERAL HILLIER WAS IN DARFUR 26-28 APR 05 AND PM MARTIN AND OTHER SENIOR CANADIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE VISITED THE REGION AS WELL. WHILE WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE CANADA MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NATO AND TO NOT DILUTE THEIR COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN THEY ARE LOOKING FOR THE MOST EXPEDIENT WAY TO CONTRIBUTE (DUE TO THE POLITICAL CLIMATE/SCHEDULE) AND THAT SEEMS LIKELY TO BE BILATERALLY WITH THE AFRICAN UNION (AU). PM MARTIN HAS ORDERED A DELAY ON PLANNING FOR AFGHANISTAN UNTIL 30 MAY WHILE A DECISION IS MADE ON DARFUR CONTRIBUTIONS (WIDELY THOUGHT TO BE 150-180 TROOPS IN A TRAINING AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT ROLE). WE EXPECT GENERAL HILLIER WILL GIVE YOU THE GOVERNMENT POSITION DURING YOUR MEETINGS. WE BELIEVE HE IS ADAMANT ON MAKING THE PLANNED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN AND IS LOATHE TO DILUTE THE AFGHANISTAN PLAN BY PLACING A LARGE FOOTPRINT IN SUDAN.

1E. (U) DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE EXPEDITIONARY SCHEDULE, INCLUDING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE FORCE (E.G., CF-18S).

1F. (C/RELCAN) FOCUS ON MISSIONS IN FAILED/FAILING STATES AND MOVE AWAY FROM CAPABILITIES NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THIS MISSION BUBBLE.,

1G. (C/NF) IMPROVING CANADA,S JTF-2 SOF, TO INCLUDE NEW TIER-2 CAPABILITIES. FORM A SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP INTEGRATING SOF AIR, NAVAL, AND ENABLE ASSETS UNDER ONE COMMANDER.

1H. (C/RELCAN) DESIGNATE CANADA AS AN AREA OF OPERATIONS AND MAKING CONTINENTAL SECURITY JOB ONE, IMPROVING MARITIME SURVEILLANCE, HLD C2 AND ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY.

14. (C/RELCAN) AS YOU HEARD IN APRIL, GEN HILLIER WANTS TO RAPIDLY CREATE CANADA COMMAND (CANCOM) AS A CONTINENTAL COUNTERPART TO USNORTHCOM WITH CANADA AS AN AOO. GEN HILLIER WANTS CANCOM TO BE IOC BY 1 SEPT 05. CANCOM WILL HAVE SIX REGIONAL JOINT HEADQUARTERS (MOST LIKELY HALIFAX; QUEBEC/MONTREAL; KINGSTON; WINNIPEG; ESQUIMALT/VICTORIA; YELLOWKNIFE). UNDER HIS PLAN, CANCOM WILL BE THE SINGLE DEFENSE POC FOR:

A.(C/RELCAN) DOMESTIC OPERATIONS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT IN CANADA AND FOR OTHER CANADIAN SECURITY PARTNERS.

B.(C/RELCAN) NATIONAL COORDINATION FOR PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA (PSEPC, THE CANADIAN EQUIVALENT TO DHS).

C.(C/RELCAN) ALL MIL-TO-MIL PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA).

15. (C) GEN HILLIER,S NEW VISION IS REFRESHING AND MARKS A SIGNIFICANT NEW DIRECTION FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES, BUT IT FACES MANY CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTATION:

1A. (C) THE CANADIAN ACQUISITION CYCLE IS NOT POSTURED TO FIELD THE SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT THE VISION IN THE TIMEFRAME GEN HILLIER WANTS. THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM IS HYPER-POLITICIZED, HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND MANUFACTURING COUNTRY LOBBYING, AND HAS AVERAGED 10 YEARS TO MAKE ACQUISITIONS. EVEN THE NON-CONTROVERSIAL ACQUISITION OF A NEW FIXED-WING SEARCH-AND-RESCUE (SAR) AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO BE OUTSIDE THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND FAST-TRACKED FOR DELIVERIES IN 18 MONTHS (BY SEPT 2005) IS MIRED IN INTERNAL REVIEW AND THE REQUIREMENTS ARE YET TO BE FIRMLY DEFINED. A MORE TROUBLING EXAMPLE IS THE CASE OF THE MARITIME HELICOPTER PROJECT WHICH, AFTER 15 YEARS, FINALLY WENT TO CONTRACT IN 2004. ON 6 APRIL 05, A FEDERAL JUDGE OPENED THE SELECTION TO LITIGATION BY THE LOSING COMPETITOR AND THAT ACQUISITION PROGRAM MAY BE REOPENED AND DELAY FIELDING OF A NEW HELICOPTER UNTIL AFTER THE POINT WHERE CURRENT SEA-KINGS WILL HAVE TO BE GROUNDED FOR SAFETY REASONS.

1B. (C) CANADA FACES A MAJOR SHORTFALL IN STRATEGIC LIFT - BOTH STRAT AIRLIFT (THEY HAVE NONE) AND SEALIFT (THEY HAVE VERY LITTLE). COSTS OF RENTING STRATAIR ARE INCREASING AT THE SAME TIME AVAILABILITY IS DECREASING. CANADIAN TACTICAL AIRLIFT IS ON LIFE SUPPORT WITH ONLY 6 OF 32 C-130S NORMALLY AVAILABLE. CANADA IS ALREADY RENTING CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT TO FILL C-130 MISSIONS SUCH AS NORTHERN BASE RESUPPLY, OFFICIAL DELEGATION TRAVEL IN CANADA, AND PARACHUTE TRAINING. CANADA DESPERATELY NEEDS AIRLIFT BOTH TO DEPLOY FOR NATO AND COALITION OPERATIONS AND TO SUPPORT DOMESTIC OPERATIONS SUCH AS MOVEMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES, DISASTER RELIEF, AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SHOULD IT BE REQUIRED. GEN HILLIER,S VISION OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP WITH A BATTALION ON CALL IS YEARS AWAY AND MANY DOUBT CANADA CAN EVEN AFFORD THE LPD-CLASS SHIP REQUIRED, EVEN IF ONLY ONE IS PURCHASED AND BASED FOR OPERATIONS JUST ON THE EAST COAST (HALIFAX/SHEARWATER).

1C. (C) EVEN GIVEN THE BUDGET PLUS-UP BEGINNING IN FY07, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO CAPITALIZE GEN HILLIER'S VISION. USED EQUIPMENT MAY SEEM ATTRACTIVE FROM A TIMING AND FINANCIAL STANDPOINT, BUT ANY USED EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS WILL FACE EXTRAORDINARY SCRUTINY, AND LIKELY NOT GAIN POLITICAL APPROVAL, IN THE WAKE OF THE SUB FIRE FIASCO WITH A USED UK SUBMARINE (HMCS CHICOUTIMI). CANADIANS ARE ADAMANT ABOUT GIVING THEIR TROOPS THE BEST EQUIPMENT - THEY JUST DON'T WANT TO HAVE TO PAY FOR IT.

1D. (C) WHILE CANADA DOES WHAT IT NEEDS TO FOR HOMELAND AND CONTINENTAL DEFENSE THEY ARE FAR BEHIND THE U.S. IN PREPARING FOR ASYMMETRIC THREATS, WORKING DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA) CHALLENGES, AND WORKING THE INTERAGENCY PROBLEM. GEN HILLIER WILL WANT TO BENCHMARK FROM NORTHCOM'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE IACG. CANADA DOES ALSO NOT HAVE THE SAME PERCEPTION OF NOR SENSE OF URGENCY TO DEAL WITH POTENTIAL THREATS. THEY ARE JUST NOW REACHING IOC WITH A CBRNE REACTION TEAM (ONE).

1E. (C) CANADIANS EXPECT THE CANADIAN FORCES TO DEFEND CANADA AND WILL SEVERELY CRITICIZE THEM IF THE TIME COMES WHEN THEY CANNOT, BUT CANADIANS LIKE TO SEE THEIR FORCES ABROAD HELPING IN FAILED/FAILING STATES -- AND THE POLITICAL MASTERS DEMAND IT. CANADA HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REFUSE A MISSION ABROAD BECAUSE OF HLD, FOR EXAMPLE. THIS IS WHY GEN HILLIER IS FOCUSED ON THE 3-BLOCK WAR BUBBLE, AND PROGRAMS/CAPABILITIES THAT DO NOT CONTRIBUTE WILL BE DISCONTINUED. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OF GEN HILLIER'S FIRST ORDERS WAS THE CANCELLATION OF THE ADVANCED SHORT-RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE (ASRAAM) TO SAVE USD 150 MILLION FOR OTHER PROJECTS. THIS FLIES IN THE FACE OF THE HOMELAND/CONTINENTAL DEFENSE FIRST MANTRA AND COULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL HLD/NORAD IMPACT. CF-18S WILL BE UNABLE TO ATTACK (EXCEPT WITH GUN) IN THE EVENT OF RADAR/AMRAAM FAILURE ONCE THEIR AIM-9MS ARE RETIRED. AMAZINGLY, THE HELMET-MOUNTED SIGHT (JHMCS) TO SUPPORT THE NEW ALL-ASPECT IR MISSILE IS STILL FUNDED. SAO CANADA AND INDUSTRY (RAYTHEON) ARE WORKING ON A PROPOSAL TO EQUIP CF-18S WITH AIM-9X WHICH WOULD BE INTEROPERABLE WITH U.S. NORAD FIGHTERS. A SMALL NUMBER OF MISSILES FOR ALERT AIRCRAFT (40-50) COUPLED WITH CAPTIVE TRAINING MISSILES (CATM) FOR THE ENTIRE CF-18 FLEET COULD BE ACQUIRED FOR USD 10-20 MILLION DEPENDING UPON THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH REMANUFACTURING RETIRING AIM-9M MISSILES. THE NEW RADAR WARNING RECEIVER (ALR-67V3) HAS YET TO BE FUNDED AND IS ALSO AT RISK IN THE CONTEXT THAT IT DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO DEPLOYED OPERATIONS IN THE 3-BLOCK WAR BUBBLE, WHERE GEN HILLIER ENVISIONS A BENIGN AIR THREAT ENVIRONMENT.

1F. (C) GEN HILLIER IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER BOTH POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC PUSHBACK ON MANY OF HIS INITIATIVES. THE SENATE, AN APPOINTED BODY WITH LIMITED REAL POWERS, HAS ALREADY SAID ITS DEFENSE COMMITTEES WILL TAKE UP TO A YEAR TO DO THEIR OWN REVIEW OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW AND TRAVEL AROUND CANADA PULSING THE POPULATION ON THE STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION. THE BUREAUCRATIC CHALLENGES WILL BE TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY (LARGELY STAMPED OUT IN RECENT YEARS) OVER BUDGET AND ACQUISITIONS AND TO GET THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM TO BE RESPONSIVE TO MILITARY TIMETABLES.

16. (C) AS YOU KNOW, AS PART OF CANADA'S CAMPAIGN TO CONVEY THAT IT IS SERIOUS ABOUT THE DEFENSE REVIEW AND INCREASING MILITARY CAPABILITIES, AND IN HOPES OF SOFTENING THE BLOW ON MISSILE DEFENSE, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTED TO BOOSTING THE DEFENSE BUDGET BY USD 10 BILLION OVER FIVE YEARS. OF THIS, 90 PERCENT IS IN THE OUTYEARS (FY07-09) AND 35 PERCENT OF THE FY05 AND 45 PERCENT OF THE FY06 INCREASES ARE ALREADY SLATED FOR RETURN TO THE GOVERNMENT AS PART OF A GOVERNMENT-WIDE EFFICIENCY CLAWBACK., WITH THE INSTABILITY OF A MINORITY GOVERNMENT AND THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IN THE OUTYEARS, NO ONE IS BETTING THAT DEFENSE WILL SEE ALL THE PROMISED RESOURCES. STILL, IT IS A HUGE STEP FORWARD AND FOR THE TIME BEING GEN HILLIER HAS A COMMITMENT FROM THE TREASURY BOARD THAT THE USD 10 BILLION INCREASE IS A BASELINE.,

17. (C) CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES CAPABILITIES: WHAT LIES AHEAD. THE CANADIAN FORCES, AND THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE IN PARTICULAR, ARE STRETCHED AND OVER-TASKED, SURVIVING PRIMARILY ON THE QUALITY OF THEIR PEOPLE. INSIDERS INVOLVED WITH DEFENSE ISSUES BELIEVE THAT CANADA IS STILL UNABLE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE KINDS OF CHOICES IT MUST MAKE IN ORDER TO PREVENT ITS MILITARY FROM BECOMING IRRELEVANT. WHILE SMALL NUMBERS OF HIGHLY CAPABLE FORCES EXIST, SUCH AS JTF-2 TIER-1 SOF COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCES (LESS THAN 300 TRIGGER PULLERS), CANADA IS UNWILLING TO MOVE INTO THE NICHE AREAS WHICH THE BUDGET CAN SUPPORT. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, CANADIAN FORCES WILL REMAIN AROUND 50,000 - CERTAINLY NOT EXCEEDING 60,000. EVEN WITH A DOUBLING OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET CANADA COULD NOT RECAPITALIZE ITS EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE FOR PERHAPS 15 YEARS, AND NO ONE PREDICTS THOSE SORT OF FUNDING LEVELS (UNLESS PERHAPS IN THE UNFORTUNATE EVENT CANADA WERE TO EXPERIENCE A MAJOR 9-11 TYPE ATTACK). GIVING UP ON MAJOR MISSION AREAS, SUCH AS AN OPERATIONAL BLUE WATER NAVY (AND MOVING TO SUPPORT/TRANSPORT AND 200 MILE SECURITY MISSIONS), IS THE ONLY WAY CANADA CAN FULLY FUND AND SUPPORT

OPERATIONS WITH EXISTING (OR FORECAST) BUDGETS. CANADA SEEMS DESTINED TO HOBBLE ALONG WITH ONE OF THE SMALLEST MILITARIES IN THE WORLD TO FIELD A COMPLETE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS CANADIAN FORCES AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED SO LONG THERE IS NO WAY WITHIN THE CURRENT CANADIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT AND WITH COMPETING BUDGETARY PRESSURES FOR THEM TO RETURN TO PREVIOUS CAPABILITIES. THE STRATEGIC TREND IS THAT THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE (REDUCING TO 49 AVAILABLE CF-18S WHICH HAVE NOT DEPLOYED OUTSIDE AMERICA SINCE 1999) AND THE CANADIAN NAVY (THREE READY SHIPS) WILL EVOLVE INTO A HOMELAND/CONTINENTAL DEFENSE FORCE. THE SAME FATE AWAITS THE CANADIAN ARMY UNLESS CANADA ACQUIRES STRATEGIC AIRLIFT TO PROVIDE THE MOBILITY REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT GEN HILLIER,S VISION.

18. (U) CURRENT ISSUES:

1A. (C) HOMELAND DEFENSE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS INAUGURATION, THE PM CREATED A NEW MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA (PSEPC), AN INSTITUTION ANALOGOUS TO THE U.S. DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. THE AGENCY'S GOAL IS TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND COORDINATE EMERGENCY RESPONSES. ALTHOUGH THE LINES OF AUTHORITY OF THIS MINISTRY ARE STILL BEING DRAWN AND THEY ARE MORE FOCUSED ON INTERNAL ORGANIZATION THAN STANDING UP A WORKING ORGANIZATION, IT ALREADY HAS ESTABLISHED LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH COUNTERPART USG AGENCIES, ALBEIT WITHOUT THE SAME SENSE OF URGENCY.

1B. (C) MARITIME SECURITY. ALTHOUGH THIS IS SLOWLY CHANGING, CANADA'S MARITIME SECURITY STRUCTURE HAS BEEN ADMINISTERED IN AN UNCOORDINATED FASHION BETWEEN A PLETHORA OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. IN TERMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (RCMP) IS THE ONLY NATIONAL AGENCY WITH A DAY-TO-DAY, LEGISLATED MANDATE TO POLICE ALL CANADIAN WATERS. IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, CANADIAN MARITIME FORCES (NAVY) CAN AND HAVE BEEN GIVEN LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS AND BECOME INVOLVED IN MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS IF SPECIAL AUTHORITY IS GRANTED BY GOVERNMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD, A SUB-AGENCY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS (DFO), IS TASKED WITH A COLLECTION OF MARINE PROGRAMS AND SERVICE MISSIONS AND DOES NOT FULFILL A LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTION.

1C. (C/RELCAN) NORAD RENEWAL. THE CREATION OF CANCOM AND THE SHORT NEGOTIATING TIMELINE FOR NORAD RENEWAL ARE LIKELY TO LIMIT PROGRESS IN EXPANDING NORAD. ALTHOUGH THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO DISCUSS NORAD EXPANSION INTO OTHER DOMAINS, THE SENSITIVE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH MARITIME CONTROL (AND THE FACT THAT THE MARITIME OPERATORS DO NOT THINK IT NEEDS TO BE CHANGED) WILL LIKELY MEAN LIMITED PROGRESS IN NORAD EXPANSION/TRANSFORMATION. THERE SEEMS TO BE CONSENSUS THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE EXTENDED AS GOOD UNTIL CANCELLED, AND MOVED AWAY FROM THE REQUIREMENT FOR 5-YEAR RENEWALS. THERE IS ALSO WIDE SUPPORT FOR MAKING IT EASIER TO INCORPORATE ANY OTHER REQUIRED TASKS ONCE THOSE ARE DETERMINED.

19. (U) RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS:

1A. (C/RELCAN) WE CONTINUE TO TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE WE CAN ASSIST THE CANADIAN FORCES WITH LIFT WHEN NECESSARY. OUR INTEGRATED LOGISTICS OPERATIONS CONCEPT (ILOP) ALLOWS CANADIAN MOVEMENTS TO SEAMLESSLY INTEGRATE INTO THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM WHEN REQUIRED. OUR ACQUISITION CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENT GIVES THE CANADIAN FORCES ACCESS TO U.S. LOGISTICS AND LIFT AT THE SAME PRICE WE CHARGE OUR OWN FORCES. WE ALSO STAND READY TO ASSIST YOU IN YOUR AIRLIFT STUDY BY ALLOWING YOUR EXPERTS TO BENCHMARK THEIR REQUIREMENTS OFF OF OUR MODELS AT AIR MOBILITY COMMAND AND TRANSCOM. AFTER ALL WE ARE MOVING FROM THE SAME CONTINENT, CROSSING THE SAME OCEANS, MOVING MOSTLY THE SAME TYPES OF THINGS TO MOSTLY THE SAME PLACES.

1B. (C/RELCAN) WE THINK IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER DEVELOPING DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR JROC AND YOUR JOINT CAPABILITIES REQUIREMENTS BOARD (JCRB), PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS WHERE OUR COOPERATION ON TECHNOLOGY AND SYSTEMS COULD YIELD NEW, MORE AFFORDABLE, AND MORE SUSTAINABLE CAPABILITIES FOR SUEVILLANCE AND CONTROL OF NORTH AMERICAN AIRSPACE, OUR MARITIME APPROACHES, AND BORDER SECURITY. WE NEED TO ENSURE WE ARE COMPLETELY INTEROPERABLE IN THESE C4ISR AND ISTAR SYSTEMS TO ENHANCE CONTINENTAL SECURITY IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

1C. (C/RELCAN) NORAD NEEDS TO MAINTAIN FULL-SPECTRUM AIR INTERCEPT AND ATTACK CAPABILITY, PARTICULARLY AGAINST THE CRUISE MISSILE THREAT OUTLINED IN THE CANUS THREAT ASSESSMENT. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR PRIORITIES HAVE RESULTED IN NOT FIELDING AN IMPROVED INFRARED MISSILE FOR THE CF-18 AT THIS TIME. WE WOULD LIKE TO HELP YOU LOOK FOR AFFORDABLE ALTERNATIVES TO FIELD THIS IMPORTANT CAPABILITY AT LEAST FOR NORAD ALERT FIGHTERS AND KEEP CANADIAN FIGHTERS INTEROPERABLE AND CAPABLE WITH THE LATEST MUNITIONS TO MATCH THEIR IMPROVED AVIONICS CAPABILITIES.

1D. (C/RELCAN) WE THINK THE SAME CAPABILITIES THAT MAKE US

STRONG IN THE HOME, GAME ARE ESSENTIAL TO MAKING OUR
FORCES CREDIBLE, CAPABLE, AND USABLE FOR THE AWAY, GAME.

1E. (C/RELCAN) MAKING THE NORAD AGREEMENT AN ENDURING
ARRANGEMENT NOT SUBJECT TO FIVE YEAR RENEWALS WILL SHOW A
STRONG COMMITMENT BY BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES TO NORAD AS AN
INSTITUTION, AND REDUCE NORAD,S EXPOSURE TO POLITICALLY
OPPORTUNE, CRITICISM.

1F. (C/RELCAN) NORAD,S RENEWAL IS A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR
ADDRESSING GAPS AND SEAMS IN OUR MUTUAL HOMELAND DEFENSE
EFFORTS. WHETHER WE INVEST FUTURE COOPERATION BINATIONALLY
IN NORAD, BI-LATERALLY BETWEEN CANCOM AND NORTHCOM, OR BOTH,
WE NEED TO ENSURE WE COOPERATE IN A VERY DELIBERATE AND
COMPREHENSIVE MANNER.

110. (U) POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS COL DAVE BRACKETT, DEFENSE
AND AIR ATTACHE, USDAO OTTAWA. UNCLAS 613-688-5401. STU-III
613-688-3123. SIPRNET: DIBRADS(AT)NOTES.DAWN.DIA.SMIL.MIL.